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Abstract
In many voice biometrics applications there is a require-
ment to preserve privacy, not least because of the recently en-
forced General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Though
progress in bringing privacy preservation to voice biometrics
is lagging behind developments in other biometrics communi-
ties, recent years have seen rapid progress, with secure com-
putation mechanisms such as homomorphic encryption being
applied successfully to speaker recognition. Even so, the com-
putational overhead incurred by processing speech data in the
encrypted domain is substantial. While still tolerable for sin-
gle biometric comparisons, most state-of-the-art systems per-
form some form of cohort-based score normalisation, requir-
ing many thousands of biometric comparisons. The compu-
tational overhead is then prohibitive, meaning that one must
accept either degraded performance (no score normalisation)
or potential for privacy violations. This paper proposes the
first computationally feasible approach to privacy-preserving
cohort score normalisation. Our solution is a cohort pruning
scheme based on secure multi-party computation which enables
privacy-preserving score normalisation using probabilistic lin-
ear discriminant analysis (PLDA) comparisons. The solution
operates upon binary voice representations. While the bina-
risation is lossy in biometric rank-1 performance, it supports
computationally-feasible biometric rank-n comparisons in the
encrypted domain.
Index Terms: privacy, speaker recognition, score normalisa-
tion, binary keys, secure computation
1. Introduction
Today there is a growing drive to bring privacy preservation to
the realm of speech processing. Following new privacy regu-
lation such as the European GDPR [1], technology to protect
sensitive data, including voice data, is attracting the attention
of researchers and industrial stakeholders alike. Perhaps the
most compelling argument to preserve privacy in speech sig-
nals is because they represent inherently personal and private
information. Examples include paralinguistic and extralinguis-
tic information, attributes and characteristics, e.g., gender, age,
language, dialect, accent, health status, general well-being and
emotional state—and the biometric identity.
This paper concerns the protection of privacy for voice bio-
metric applications, e.g. speaker recognition. Recent years have
seen rapid progress in privacy-preserving speaker recognition,
e.g. [2, 3]. The most recent contribution to the field [4] reported
the first i-vector-based solution using homomorphic encryption
(HE). HE supports computation upon sensitive biometric voice
data in the encrypted domain and is a popular tool for privacy
preservation. However, the computational demands of HE are
prohibitive. This is especially true in the case of speaker recog-
nition systems that employ some form of cohort score normal-
isation. When operating in unconstrained environments cohort
score normalisation is key to performance and is a feature of any
state-of-the-art solution. Unfortunately, cohort score normali-
sation only compounds the computational burden of encryption
since it typically involves many thousands of biometric com-
parisons in the scoring of a single utterance. The scale of the
computational demands are currently a bottleneck to privacy
preservation for speaker recognition.
The work reported in this paper aims to overcome this bot-
tleneck with an alternative, efficient approach to cohort score
normalisation. Using an efficient approach to speaker mod-
elling [5], we propose to replace the speaker representation
used in cohort score normalisation with an alternative binary
key (BK) representation. As a native binary representation, BKs
are readily suited to efficient computation in the encrypted do-
main. The paper shows that the computational overhead of
operating upon encrypted representations can then be reduced
greatly, meaning that probabilistic linear discriminant analysis
(PLDA) comparisons can, for the first time, be performed in the
encrypted domain with realistic computational resources.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the
related work in privacy-preserving speaker recognition. Sec-
tion 3 describes BK voice representations. Section 4 describes
the proposed efficient cohort pruning scheme using BK rep-
resentations and shows how it can be employed for privacy-
preserving score normalisation. Section 5 presents an experi-
mental validation. Conclusions are provided in Section 6.
2. Preliminaries and Related Work
There is an extensive body of literature concerning the preser-
vation of privacy in biometrics. Unfortunately, most relates not
to speaker recognition, but to other biometric characteristics,
e.g. fingerprint, iris, and face recognition [6, 7]. Whatever the
characteristic, the requirements for effective privacy preserva-
tion are the same. These are outlined in the ISO/IEC 24745
standard [8] which stipulates that biometric information must
be unlinkable (data of protected databases are not relatable), ir-
reversible (neither embeddings nor audio can be recreated from
protected data), and renewable (no biometric voice data needs
to be recaptured to update a privacy-preservation algorithm).
The conventional approach to meet these requirements in-
volves some form of encryption. Since the late 1980s, the focus
of the cryptographic community is secure computation [9, 10],
specifically the evaluation of a function in ways that do not re-
veal any information about the inputs of the involved parties,
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except for the results. Secure computation mechanisms may be
harnessed to retain the functionality of an application without
compromising the privacy of the involved parties. The main
techniques include homomorphic encryption (HE) which en-
ables computations to be carried out on ciphertexts, and secure
multi-party computation (SMPC) which allows interactive com-
putations on data that is secretly shared1 between the parties.2
Recent advances in state-of-the-art implementations of se-
cure computation protocols (cf. [11]) have shown to be efficient
solutions to privacy preservation in a wide variety of applica-
tions [12]. Even so, different solutions offer different levels of
computational complexity. SMPC protocols typically involve
multiple rounds of interaction (communications between par-
ties involved in the secure computation). While not necessarily
requiring interaction, HE usually incurs a higher computational
overhead. It follows that, while deployed secure computation
techniques can be highly efficient and scalable, it depends on
the use case and the employed mechanisms.
Both SMPC and HE have been applied successfully to
privacy-preserving speaker recognition [2, 13, 14, 15, 16]. This
body of work explores privacy preservation in traditional Gaus-
sian mixture model (GMM) and hidden Markov model (HMM)
architectures. Typically, HE is used to hide biometric infor-
mation, while scoring is sometimes performed using SMPC.
The solution reported in [15, 16] preserves privacy in an HMM
framework by storing the corresponding secret shares among
multiple servers, a technique known as outsourced SMPC [17].
Of course, software solutions are not the only approach to pri-
vacy preservation. The work in [18] shows how privacy can
also be preserved by using trusted execution environments such
as the Intel SGX architecture [19].
Recently, in [4], an HE-based solution to privacy preserva-
tion in the form of the Paillier cryptosystem has been applied
to state-of-the-art speaker recognition architectures including
i-vector systems using PLDA. This work shows that a one-
to-one PLDA comparison can be computed in a few hundred
milliseconds, depending on whether the speaker model is also
protected. Unfortunately, while the solution delivers privacy
preservation with no degradation to computational precision, it
does not scale well. Protection of a cohort score normalisation
process which requires many thousands of comparisons is com-
putationally prohibitive; a runtime in the order of 50 minutes
would be needed to process one reference-probe comparison in-
volving 10 000 cohort comparisons, a representative number for
today’s state-of-the-art techniques.
With cohort score normalisation being a feature of any
state-of-the-art approach to speaker recognition, and with per-
formance degradation being the cost of its omission, there is
hence an interest to devise computationally manageable solu-
tions. With no previous work having considered this problem
thus far, this is the goal of the research reported in this paper.
1E.g., in the Boolean Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson (GMW) proto-
col [10] for two parties that we will use in our work, an input bitstring
x can be secretly shared among the parties by sending a random bit-
string r of the same length to one party and sending x ⊕ r to the other
party. Then, the GMW protocol can be executed to securely compute
any functionality on x using just the shares of x. The inputs stay hidden
because neither r nor x⊕ r reveal any information about x.
2 Depending on the use case, a party could be a client device, an au-
thentication, or a database/processing server. In contrast to the plaintext
domain (one party is sufficient to carry out a computation), security in
SMPC is established by splitting computations in a distributed system
architecture, where each party computes only on secretly shared data.
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Figure 1: BK extraction process from T frames with F -
dimensional acoustic features to BKs from a KBM with A an-
chors for each of the C UBM components. Before setting K
KBM elements as True at the sample level,M elements are pre-
selected at the frame level.
3. Binary Key Voice Representations
Binary voice representations have been reported previously in
the context of privacy preservation. Cryptobiometric (extrac-
tion/binding of cryptographic keys from biometric data)3 sys-
tems based upon the binarisation4 of GMM-based supervectors
are reported in [20, 3]. The work in this paper uses an alter-
native, more elaborate approach based upon binary keys (BKs),
originally proposed in [5, 21]. The BK approach takes a more
speaker-discriminatory approach to modelling, much like the
idea behind anchor models [22, 23]. The same versatile ap-
proach has been applied successfully to a number of related
problems including emotion recognition [24], speaker change
detection [25], speaker diarization [26, 27] and privacy preser-
vation [28] in the context of cancelable biometric systems (irre-
versible feature transforms). Full details of the implementation
used in this paper can be found in [5].
The extraction of BKs is performed using a so-called binary
key background model (KBM). The KBM plays a role similar to
that of a conventional universal background model (UBM) but,
instead of representing the acoustic space in an expected sense,
it is formed from the concatenation of a number A of speaker-
dependent models (learned using traditional UBM maximum a-
posteriori adaptation). The role of the KBM anchors is similar
in principle to a latent speaker subspace (PLDA alike; in a rough
approximation), namely the extraction of discriminant BKs.
The BK extraction process is illustrated in Figure 1. From
acoustic features (a), KBM component likelihoods are com-
puted (b). Similarly to i-vector extraction [29], in which com-
ponent posteriors are pooled to zero order statistics, top-M like-
lihoods (which at the frame level equals the top-M component
posteriors) are used to determine the most frequently activated
components (c); again, a rough approximation. An even more
compressed speaker representation (d) is obtained with the final
BK representation which indicates simply the K elements with
the highest pooled mean statistics.
The research hypothesis under investigation is: the loss in
precision will be tolerable given their use only for cohort prun-
ing; their use will cause only marginal degradation to the benefit
of score normalisation while nonetheless facilitating privacy.
3 In contrast, HE uses cryptographic keys for de-/encrypting biomet-
ric data (biometrics in the encrypted domain).
4 The term binarisation is potentially misleading. It refers to a
higher level binary representation (under the acceptance of precision
loss) of digital speech data (which is itself already stored in binary bit
form).
4. Privacy-Preserving Cohort Pruning
The contribution in this paper is an efficient, privacy-preserving
approach to score normalisation. It is based upon cohort prun-
ing using BK speaker representations that allow for efficient
computation in the encrypted domain. The use of HE-protected
i-vectors here is too slow; unprotected i-vectors are not unlink-
able. The following describes the approach and shows how
computation is performed using SMPC while preserving the
privacy of both data subjects and cohort speakers.
4.1. Score normalisation
Score normalisation is a processing step of any state-of-the-art
approach to ASV. It is applied to remove nuisance bias and vari-
ation that would otherwise influence comparison scores in di-
verse environmental conditions. The general approach to nor-
malisation is based upon a set of auxiliary scores resulting from
comparisons between references, probes, and cohort data. A
score S is normalised to S′ according to S′ = S−µ
σ
, where the
mean µ and standard deviation σ are derived from (Gaussian
distributed) scores of comparisons with cohort data.
In the case that comparisons involve reference data, this ap-
proach is referred to as zero normalisation (z-norm). In this
case, cohort data characteristics are assumed to match those of
the probe P (which are fixed for one quality condition). Nor-
malisation is then performed using the mean µR and standard
deviation σR derived from the set of comparison scoresR.
Normalisation can also be applied using probe data. This is
known as test normalisation (t-norm). Here, cohort data charac-
teristics are assumed to match those of the reference, in which
case the cohort data consists of reference representations. Nor-
malisation is then performed using the mean µP and standard
deviation σP derived from the set of comparison scores P .
Typically, cohort score distributions are rarely Gaussian-
distributed. Adaptive z-norm (az-norm) and t-norm (at-norm)
are commonly applied instead in order to account for this dis-
crepancy. In practice, normalisation is performed with only the
top-n scores ofR and P and, for i-vectors, both (a)z-norm and
(a)t-norm are usually combined in symmetric fashion, giving
(a)s-norm: S′ = 1
2
(
S−µR
σR
+ S−µP
σP
)
. The normalisation pro-
cess too needs to preserve privacy.
4.2. Privacy preservation
By using [4], privacy-preserving score normalisation can be
performed using reference, probe, and cohort embeddings, all
processed in the encrypted domain via HE-based PLDA (HE-
PLDA) [4]. The resulting, encrypted scores R, S, and P , none
of which reveal any sensitive information, can then be decrypted
by an authentication server in order that normalised scores S′
can be computed in the plaintext domain.
Assessments of computing demands were performed
with a Python implementation of HE-PLDA with two 400-
dimensional embeddings, 64-bit floating point precision and a
key size of 3072 bits (recommended by NIST [30] in order to
support adequate security given advances in computing power
until 2030 and beyond) running on an Intel Core i9-7960X CPU
with 128 GB of RAM. Computations require 320 ms per com-
parison when only subject data is encrypted (target in this pa-
per), and 973 109 ms per comparison when both subject data
and PLDA model parameters are encrypted (the second archi-
tecture in [4]). Since a cohort size exceeding some few thousand
voice samples is not unusual, the privacy-preserving computa-
tion ofR,P is computationally prohibitive.
reference
sample
probe
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reference
embedding
probe
embedding
reference
binary key
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binary key
cohort
P alike
cohort
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AND AND
top-n
pruning
top-n
pruning
PLDA PLDAPLDA
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HE-PLDA,
using [4]
proposed
Figure 2: Our proposed privacy-preserving as-norm protocol
with cohort pruning (green dashed area). The red dotted areas
indicate that operations are carried out in the encrypted domain
and do not leak any information except the decryptable outputs.
4.3. Cohort pruning
The research hypothesis under investigation here is that the se-
lection of top-n relevant cohort comparisons can be performed
more efficiently by accepting some modest degradation to com-
putational precision, while still preserving privacy. Instead of
selecting the top-n cohort comparisons using ASV scores, they
are selected using measures of acoustic similarity derived from
BK representations of reference, probe, and cohort samples. As
illustrated in Figure 2, using BK representations, HE-PLDA can
then be made efficient via secure bit-wise AND operations and
top-n cohort pruning.
More precisely, we employ the Boolean GMW proto-
col [10] (cf. Section 2) in the case of two involved parties
to securely compute our proposed cohort pruning technique.
Probe, reference, and cohort BKs are secretly shared between
two servers that jointly and securely compute the top-n prun-
ing. This principle is referred to as outsourced secure com-
putation [17]. Assuming non-colluding servers as in [4], this
approach can tolerate the corruption of one server without any
privacy leakage. This assumption can be seen as realistic, given
that one server could be supplied by an independent provider.
Since we use protocols with semi-honest security here, the se-
cure pruning requires servers that honestly follow the protocol.
Using the GMW protocol, we can easily compute an AND
between the secretly shared sample and all secretly shared co-
hort data. On the resulting shares, we then securely compute
the Hamming weight using the circuit of [31] and perform a
secure top-n pruning as optimised in [32]. As a result, the iden-
tifiers of the top-n embeddings are revealed and can be used for
score normalisation. Apart from this information, nothing else
is leaked about the sample and cohort voice data.
5. Experimental Validation
Given the research objective to demonstrate improvements in
computational efficiency, rather than improved performance,
only brief details of the text-independent speaker recognition
system are provided here. It is based on 400-dimensional i-
vectors, extracted from conventional acoustic features using
time delay deep neural network (TDNN) for estimating UBM
posteriors. The TDNN is trained using the KALDI toolkit [33]
with SRE’04-08 and SWBD data (not x-vectors). The Python
backend is based on PLDA with mean and length normalisa-
tion, and trained with SRE’04-08 data. The KBM used for BK
extraction is learned in Matlab using a 2 048-component UBM
trained with conventional acoustic features andA = 20 anchors
(10 fe/male each). KBM optimisation is performed using a sub-
set of the cohort set containing data from 71 speakers. For BK
extraction, at feature level the top M = 1 components are acti-
vated, while at sample level the top K = 2048 bits are set. The
cohort set is a subset of the PLDA training set with 11 640 voice
samples of 3 812 speakers. The proposed approach is evaluated
on the 2010 NIST SRE common condition 5, particularly the
core-core and core-10s protocols. In order to report on diverse
data, we pooled the scores of both protocols (core-core/10s).
5.1. Recognition results
Results are reported in terms of Cminllr , the minimum decision
cost function (minDCF; effective prior 0.01) and the equal-error
rate (EER). Table 1 shows that conventional as-norm gives the
same or better performance than the baseline system (without
any score normalisation). The proposed privacy-preserving as-
norm solution gives slightly worse results in terms of minDCF
even though, curiously, improvements are observed in terms of
Cminllr and EER. For minDCF, an improvement over the base-
line is also observed but without reaching the performance of
the unprotected AS-norm. This result confirms our research
hypothesis: privacy preservation incurs only a modest perfor-
mance degradation (in the minDCF sense) and, encouragingly,
also improves upon the baseline system without any score nor-
malisation (in the Cminllr and EER sense).
5.2. Proof of biometric information protection
The sample embeddings as well as the cohort embeddings used
for PLDA comparisons are protected via the original privacy-
preserving PLDA system. As such, if biometric information
protection in the form of unlinkability, irreversibility, and re-
newability is given by the original system (as in [4]), then
the embeddings are protected as well. The BKs of samples
and cohorts are protected by the Boolean secret sharing of the
GMW protocol between two servers (cf. Section 2). Because of
the information-theoretic indistinguishability of any two secret
shares, unlinkablitity and irreversibility are guaranteed. Due to
the nature of secret sharing, the protected data is also renewable;
secret shares can be re-randomised with a new random bitstring.
5.3. Complexity analysis
We implemented our secure cohort pruning architecture using
the state-of-the-art SMPC framework ABY [12]. We ran our
implementations on two machines with Intel Core i9-7960X
CPUs and 128 GBs of RAM. To simulate real-world network
conditions of the involved servers, we restricted the connection
between the servers to 1 Gbit/s bandwith and 1 ms round trip
time. Results are presented in Table 1. Note that these are the
online runtimes and that some additional input-independent pre-
computation is required; we account for the BK extraction time5
(28.3 s and 3.2 s for a core-core and for a core-10s probe, respec-
tively; for core-core/10s, the average is 16.9 s). The largest gain
in real-world network conditions for privacy-preserving score
normalisation are observed for small cohorts with 14× to 19×
5 BKs are extracted with Matlab on a DELL R620 with two Intel
Xeon E5-2630L CPUs and 128 GBs of RAM.
Table 1: Runtimes and recognition results for the baseline sys-
tem, the baseline system with conventional as-norm and the pro-
posed privacy-preserving alternative, for different cohort sizes
n. The realtime improvement results from dividing the time of
scoring all cohort data with HE-PLDA by: BK extraction +
GMW (scoring and top-n sorting) + top-n HE-PLDA time.
n 50 100 150 200 250 300 400
Baseline (Cminllr / minDCF / EER) 0.161 / 0.410 / 4.6
Runtime top-n HE-PLDA (necessary) 16 s 32 s 48 s 64 s 80 s 96 s 128 s
HE-PLDA (z-norm) 3 725 s (for all 11 640 reference-cohort comparisons)
GMW pruning (BK: 28 s) 157 s 177 s 198 s 220 s 247 s 269 s 283 s
improvement (az-norm) 19× 16× 14× 12× 10× 9× 8×
HE-PLDA (t-norm) 1 220 s (for all 3 812 cohort-probe comparisons)
GMW pruning (BK: 17 s) 52 s 59 s 66 s 73 s 82 s 89 s 94 s
improvement (at-norm) 14× 11× 9× 8× 7× 6× 5×
conventional
(unprotected) as-norm
Cminllr
minDCF
EER
0.161
0.390
4.6
0.157
0.376
4.5
0.156
0.374
4.5
0.155
0.373
4.5
0.155
0.374
4.4
0.155
0.372
4.4
0.155
0.369
4.4
proposed
Cminllr
minDCF
EER
0.158
0.509
4.4
0.151
0.492
4.3
0.149
0.466
4.3
0.147
0.452
4.1
0.149
0.435
4.2
0.149
0.429
4.1
0.149
0.408
4.2
gains in runtimes. In other words, rather than runtimes in the
order of 50 minutes only a few minutes are necessary. In the
privacy-preserving cohort pruning and as-norm, the BK extrac-
tion takes 6.4-20.0% of the runtime and the GMW pruning takes
39.2-78.0% (their time share is lower on higher cohort sizes as
the runtime share of HE-PLDA increases). For the GMW prun-
ing, all privacy-preserving az/at-norm comparisons (using BKs
against the entire cohort) are carried out in less than 157 s and
52 s, respectively. These times already include the sorting of the
top-50 cohort indices for pruning the HE-PLDA cohort com-
parisons. To prune larger cohort sizes, the privacy-preserving
sorting requires additional time, e.g. from top-50 to top-400 in
az-norm, an additional 126 s are necessary.
6. Conclusions
This paper reports the first approach to computationally man-
ageable (yet demanding) privacy-preserving speaker recogni-
tion with cohort score normalisation. Prior to this work, the
latter was a computational bottleneck for PLDA with Paillier
homomorphic encryption, with normalisation strategies that re-
quire many thousands of biometric comparisons being compu-
tationally prohibitive when performed in the encrypted domain.
The set of cohort data used for score normalisation is pruned
using a native binary speaker representation. Privacy is out-
sourced via secure multi-party computation through which a
top-n cohort set is pruned securely. Privacy-insensitive cohort
scores can then be decrypted and treated in the usual way. The
cohort list is revealed to the sites capturing the reference and
the probe data, respectively. This could be used by a security
(not privacy) adversary to mount hill-climbing attacks; instead,
if the top-n lists are in the province of the biometric service
owner, these top-n indices serve the intended recognition pur-
pose. Future work could investigate the use of SMPC protocols
for carrying out ranking and matrix operations in the protected
domain (including PLDA) demanding less computational but
more server communication overheads.
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